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Abstract 
This project addresses the development of a remote monitoring solution, able to improve the Nuclear Power 
Plants safety, and strengthen the third containment barrier, in case of severe accident with reactor breakthrough 
and corium casting. To overcome any consequence of electrical power supplies loss, distributed sensing 
technologies are considered. Carefully characterized and selected, rad hard single mode optical fibers have been 
inserted into cables, with the aim to be embedded in the concrete floor below the reactor vessel, at depths 
determined by modelling, to resist high temperatures and ionizing radiations. Complementary, Self Powered 
Nuclear Detectors have been developed to identify the reactor core fusion when deployed in the vicinity of the 
reactor vessel. Optical sensors are interrogated by Raman, Brillouin and/or Rayleigh-based instrumentations, 
along with SPND by an innovative multichannel ultra-low current threshold detection system. In case of serious 
accident, such dual monitoring system will be able to detect the reactor breakthrough, the corium casting, the 
erosion phase of the concrete floor and the corium cooling. 
Introduction 
In March 11, 2011, an earthquake ranked 8 on the Richter scale, occurred on the East coast of Japan. The ensuing 
tsunami devastated the Tohoku region, causing widespread destruction of infrastructures and untold suffering for 
the population [1]. Such disaster also caused major damages on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP), which led to a core meltdown in three nuclear reactors, followed by nuclear vessels break and corium 
pouring on their concrete basement. Large amounts of radioactive materials were released into the environment. 
The accident was rated Level 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. This nuclear catastrophe showed to the 
world that the need for safety must always prevail. Few months after, the French Government published a 
research call, with 50 M€ allocated to stimulate R&D in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. 23 
projects were selected and are now operated by the French National Research Agency (ANR). 
In this context, 12 French teams built a 5-year research project called DISCOMS (DIstributed Sensors for 
Corium Monitoring & Safety) bringing together a multidisciplinary community of researchers and engineers. 
DISCOMS aims at developing an innovative under-vessel remote monitoring instrumentation to improve NPPs 
safety in operation (Pressurized Water Reactors, Gen2), under construction (European Pressurized Water 
Reactor, i.e. the Evolutionary PWR design, Gen3), as well as for any next generations of reactors. At 
Fukushima, the loss of electricity power supplies has quickly led most of the instrumentation to be inoperative 
and the operator TEPCO with no suitable solution to monitor the accident status and evolution. In order to 
overcome these drawbacks, taking advantage of the considerable potential of distributed sensing technologies 
based on both “OFS” (Raman, Brillouin, and Rayleigh Reflectometry) and long-length “Self Powered Neutron 
Detectors” (SPNDs) is considered. The aim consists in inquiring the status of the 3rd confinement barrier and 
defining possible mitigation strategies in case of severe accident, namely: i) reactor pressure vessel 
breakthrough and corium relocation outside this vessel, ii) concrete floor erosion and iii) corium cooling. Such 
monitoring should consist in “sensing cables” inserted in the concrete floor, below the reactor vessel, and 
interrogated by operators from a remote base in a safe work environment.  
1. Distributed Sensors state-of-the-art to improve NPPs’ safety 
It has been established for several decades that OFSs allow detection, measurement and localization of abnormal 
conditions. This is especially true for distributed OFSs which are able to be imbedded in structures to provide 
remote measurements or monitoring. To fulfil market requirements, over the last 20 years, optoelectronic 
distributed measurement systems have made great progress. This is the reason why, due to their performances 
and robustness, they are now increasingly deployed in demanding applications (oil & gas, civil engineering, fire 
detection, etc.). In the meantime, international R&D devoted to rad hard optical fibers has been successful, and 
it is now legitimate to consider their use in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor. In addition, over the last decade, we 
have observed industrial developments leading to the availability of sensitive optical cables dedicated to harsh 
environments. All these products give the possibility, to end users, to increase the safety by addressing many 
specific monitoring applications (e.g. Structure Health Monitoring) as those encountered in the NPPs [2, 3, 4, 5]. 
Of course, the great potential benefits of OFS technologies for the nuclear industry have been identified for a 
long time [6, 7]. But in this very conservative sector, for four decades, only few CFOs have been implemented. 
However, this situation is now evolving with the new generation of decision-makers and more open-mind 
engineers, especially since the Fukushima accident, as several risks remain a matter of concern for safety [8, 9, 
10]. NPPs safety is depending on the type of reactors and nuclear buildings, but we always may consider three 
situations: i/ Normal operation, ii/ Severe Accident situation, and iii) Post-accidental situation. 
2. Selected sensors for corium monitoring 
Two kind of sensing technologies have been pragmatically chosen. First, we selected distributed OFSs based 
on reflectometry to remotely provide sensing profiles (mainly the temperature, even if measuring strain is still 
possible) and optical fiber lengths thanks to sensing cables (OTDR), embedded at different depths in the 
basemat concrete to benefit from its radiation protection. And second, we decided to use Self-Powered Neutron 
Detectors (SPND) already in service in nuclear reactors for on-line in-core neutron fluxes monitoring since 
1960 [11]. Considering they will be deployed in the reactor core vicinity, such sensors are considered within 
the project for their sensitivity to both neutrons and . Strategically processed, SPND signals will then provide 
key information to the operators in any normal and severe accidental reactor conditions. 
3. Ionizing radiation and thermal modellings 
To design SPND and to determine the most appropriate fiber’s depth of embedment in the reactor basemat, Monte 
Carlo simulations with MCNP [12] and TRIPOLI-4 [13] transport code, were performed to determine neutron 
flux energy spectra and  doses, at various locations outside the vessel and in the basemat of a PWR. Calculations 
were performed for both Gen2 and Gen3 reactors considering various corium locations and compositions in case 
of severe accident. In order to verify that fibers will still be efficient after 60 years of operation. Calculations 
were also performed for normal operation conditions [14]. Depending on several parameters (concrete type, 
corium composition…) we consider the dose to be reduce by an order of magnitude every 15-20 cm in the 
concrete. Thermal modelling has also been conducted [15] and has concluded that the heat propagates at a slower 
speed than ablation, so that the optical cables were only heated by a few decimeters ahead of the ablation front. 
4. Optical Fibers and cables testing 
It is widely accepted that ionizing radiations affect silica fibers through the formation of color centers. Depending 
on the irradiation conditions (radiation type, dose, dose rate, temperature, or chemical/dopants composition, as 
well as the elaboration process of the fiber), these color centers introduce an attenuation much higher than the one 
encountered in the fibers currently used in telecom or in distributed sensors. And even with quite short length (100 
m) considered for corium monitoring, it was necessary to assess the RIA (Radiation Induced Attenuation) and to 
select the less sensitive fibers to be compliant with measurement systems optical budgets, in the frame of 60 years 
of monitoring, followed by the accident at the NPP end of life. In that objective, two  irradiations have been 
conducted on fibers, then on sensitive cables containing these fibers, in the POSEIDON irradiator based in Saclay. 
Various irradiation conditions have been tested, up to ~ 2 MGy at 6 kGy/h dose rate during more than 300 h. The 
first test permitted to assess the RIA at various wavelengths and to select 3 radiations tolerant fibers (RIA < 5 
dB/100 m, at 1550 nm, the smaller RIA being ~ 1 dB/100 m for one of them). The second test was conducted on 
more voluminous strands of sensitive cables encapsulating the selected fibers, with approximately the same dose, 
at two temperatures: 30°C and 80°C. A noticeable increase of RIA ~ a factor 2 appeared in fibers when inserted 
into cables, correlated with the increase of the hydroxyle attenuation peak at 1380 nm. The reasons of that increase 
are still under investigation. Nevertheless, considering short fiber lengths (< 100 m) subjected to radiations in the 
reactor building, we may consider such optical cables as good candidates for future deployments. 
5. Optical fiber measurement loop 
The optical fiber measurement loop, including 5 different monitoring systems based on Brillouin, Raman and 
Rayleigh backscattering in single-mode optical fibers at 1.55 µm, is still on preparation for the ultimate 
“Vulcano” experiment [8] which should take place by mid-2018 to demonstrate, at a small scale, their ability 
i) to detect the corium pouring on the basemat, ii) to monitor the concrete floor erosion and iii) for long term 
monitoring of the corium temperature once relocated in the core catcher (EPR). 
Five ‘security’ cables (Ø 4 mm) equipped with 2 single-mode fibers at 1.55 µm, and already qualified up to 
750°C during 1.5 h according to IEC 60331-25 standards (waveguide integrity) will be embedded in the Vulcano 
concrete slab. Each one will be connected to a dedicated measurement system to get temperature profiles (DTS 
Raman), a combination of strain and temperature variations profiles (BOTD-A Brillouin; OFDR Rayleigh) and 
the length of the cables burnt by the corium during the concrete erosion (telecom and photon counting OTDRs). 
Due to its limitations, it is expected that Brillouin measurements can take over DTS Raman above 500°C up to 
1000°C for temperature indications (project specifications are from 20°C up to 1300°C, with ± 50°C uncertainty). 
Two extra sensing cables have also been qualified, but will not be used during the Vulcano test. On one hand, 
the strain cables exhibit a maximum operating temperature close to 400°C, which can be explained by the thermal 
expansion discrepancy between their steel reinforcements and the silica fibers, leading to equivalent additional 
mechanical strain ∆𝜀 applied on the fiber close to 1%, and its subsequent failure at long term. On the other hand, 
the temperature sensing cables diameter is too large for the concrete slab, which could have led to its anticipated 
mechanical embrittlement (cracks). Redundancy will be provided during the Vulcano experiment by optical fiber 
switches in case of cable or instrument failure. The measurement systems (synchronized with a reference clock) 
and the switches will be located far from the corium facility, and secured by Uninterrupted Power Supplies. 
Measurements will be stored in real-time on a dedicated server mirrored by a second PC located in a secured 
place. At this location, measurements acquired from the instrumentations will be stored in a real-time database 
feeding a specific Human Machine Interface software application, developed in LabVIEW®. The operator will 
be able to access to usual trends and, if needed, to historian SCADA functions. In such a way, optical 
measurements are transformed into process related variables enabling the operator to get quickly and simply an 
understanding of the status of the installation in front of the corium cast. This specific configuration will enable 
to control the measurement loop from any remote station to ensure the measurements availability, or to take 
appropriate decisions in case of failure during the experiment, until the end of the corium cooling. 
6. Self-Powered Neutron Detectors 
The SPND design has been performed using a simulation toolbox named ‘MATiSSe’, developed since 2010 for 
SPND material selection and geometry design, as well as for their respective partial neutron and sensitivity 
calculations. MATiSSe output is a direct electrical current comparable to the current generated in the SPND when 
irradiated, in given neutron and conditions. Rhodium and Platinum emitter SPNDs, encapsulated in a specific 
instrumented pole, have been designed using MATiSSe, and their performances calculated for different locations 
on the reactor vessel side, and on the reactor concrete basemat. Simulations demonstrate that SPNDs will allow 
to monitor the corium progression towards the concrete basemat in case of severe accident [16]. Coupled 
temperature measurement would also provide additional data on corium migration. Another challenge is related 
to the reading and the interpretation of information delivered by such sensors. Their low sensitivity has required 
the development of robust and reliable multi-channel electronics able to acquire very low currents (1 pA lower 
limit), with low energy consumption to be autonomous with regards to energy management, in case of external 
power supply loss. The complete monitoring equipment (instrumented pole and electronic) has been fruitfully 
tested in January 2018, in realistic irradiation conditions, thanks to the Slovenian TRIGA Mark II reactor 
(Ljubljana, JSI, pool type research reactor 250 kW). In a NPP, such remote electronics will be installed (over a 
length > 200 m), e.g. in the save bunker used by operators in case of a severe accident. 
7. Sensing validation with corium casting 
A general validation is planned with prototypic corium (made with depleted Uranium oxide and structural 
material components) in the CEA Cadarache Vulcano facility [17]. During this test, OFS sensing cables will 
be installed in a concrete crucible. It is planned to install up to 5 sensing cables in the 500-mm diameter 
concrete crucible. Liquid prototypic corium at temperatures above 2000°C will interact with the concrete and 
the interaction will be remotely monitored by the distributed instrumentations. Following this experimental 
validation, final specifications of the monitoring system will be established, and recommendations will be 
prepared and submitted to both French governmental authorities and to utilities. 
Conclusion  
The DISCOMS project and its issues, regarding current scientific challenges and potential benefits for nuclear 
plant safety in case of severe accident with reactor vessel failure, have been discussed. We claim such remote 
monitoring solution based on state-of-the-art of quasi-distributed OFS and specific long-length SPND should 
greatly contribute to enhance the quality of real time information during such event, providing first responders 
and nuclear safety people with direct data concerning both the corium location and the health of the 3rd barrier 
of confinement.  In such context, the monitoring system developed in the scope of the DISCOMS project will 
enable the crisis teams in charge of handling the emergency situations on NPP to reduce the uncertainties 
associated to some tools currently used for severe accident mitigation (e.g. computations aids based on 
calculations of pre-defined Severe Accident scenarios). In particular, after the reactor pressure vessel failure, 
DISCOMS monitoring will provide the precise and real-time view of the progression front of core melt inside 
the reactor building basemat or the core catcher (if any). Based on this actual representation of the basemat 
ablation, the crisis team will be able to optimize the recommended mitigation actions, both for accident 
management on-site and population protection. In April 18, 2016 the International Atomic Energy Agency 
records 444 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) currently in operation and 64 under construction, located in 31 
countries, which means the potential market for the DISCOMS solution is worldwide. 
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